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Has Everything Been Decided?
Certainty, the Charter and
Criminal Justice
James Stribopoulos∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Closing in on the Silver Anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms,1 it is hard not to be astounded by the changes that it has
occasioned to almost every facet of our criminal justice system. Its
impact has been nothing short of revolutionary,2 moving our justice
system sharply away from a crime control and toward a due process
model.3
A quick review of the Supreme Court of Canada’s constitutional
decisions from the 2005 calendar year, however, might leave one with
the impression that the revolution is finally coming to an end. Compared
to only a decade ago,4 the Court’s output in this important area seems to
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Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. I would like to thank Alan Young,
Renee Pomerance, Gary Trotter and Kent Roach for providing feedback on an earlier draft of this
paper. Of course, any errors are mine alone.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
Kent Roach, “The Attorney General and the Charter Revisited” (2000) 50 U.T.L.J. 1, at
5. It is a revolution that Roach asserts “has fundamentally altered the law and discourse that
governs the criminal process”.
3
See generally Herbert L. Packer, “Two Models of the Criminal Process” (1964) 113 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1. See also Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1968). Packer uses the metaphor of a conveyor belt to describe the crime control
model and an obstacle course to describe the due process model. For a Canadian account of postCharter developments in light of Packer’s models, see Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims’
Rights: The New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1999).
4
For example, in 1995 the Court decided approximately 25 cases that related to criminal
law and the Charter. It should be remembered, however, that the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-46 [hereinafter “Code”] s. 691(2) was amended in 1997 to eliminate the automatic right to
appeal to the Supreme Court that used to exist whenever an acquittal at trial was overturned by the
court of appeal in the province.
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have fallen off considerably.5 This might understandably cause some
observers to believe that with the passage of time there is very little left
to be decided. In other words, subject to the odd exception, the dust has
finally settled. The Court has now spoken on almost every constitutional
issue of any significance to criminal justice. Accordingly, in future we
should expect to hear less and less from the Supreme Court on this
subject. This is a view that would likely find some prominent backers,
including Justice Moldaver of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.
Respected for his expertise in criminal law, Justice Moldaver
recently issued a strongly worded admonition to Ontario’s criminal
defence lawyers when he spoke at their annual conference in the Fall of
2005. He told the assembled audience that: “Most of the Charter issues
that you are likely to encounter on a day-to-day basis have been
thoroughly litigated, all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada. By
and large, the governing principles are now firmly established. And
where that is so, the time for experimentation is over. It’s finished. It’s

5
In contrast, in 2005, there were a total of nine cases that fit the bill. None of these
related to substantive criminal law. There were seven that related to matters of Criminal Procedure,
see: R. v. Gunning, [2005] S.C.J. No. 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 627 (Charter s. 11(f), right to jury trial —
trial judge precluded from directing verdict of guilt); R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No.
37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Orbanski & Elias”] (Charter s. 10(b), right to counsel —
whether right is implicitly overridden at the roadside for the purpose of questioning drivers about
alcohol consumption and requesting their participation in sobriety tests); Toronto Star Newspapers
Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] S.C.J. No. 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 (Charter s. 2(b), freedom of expression
and the press, whether open court principle extends to pre-trial procedures like search warrant
application materials); R. v. Wiles, [2005] S.C.J. No. 53, 2005 SCC 84 (Charter s. 12, cruel and
unusual punishment, whether imposition of firearms prohibition contravenes right); R. v. Pires; R.
v. Lising, [2005] S.C.J. No. 67, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 343 [hereinafter “Pires & Lising”] (Charter s. 8,
right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, preconditions for cross-examining search
warrant affiant on s. 8 application); R. v. Decorte, [2005] S.C.J. No. 77, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 133
(Charter s. 9, right not to be arbitrarily detained — whether First Nations Constables have legal
authority to set up R.I.D.E. check-stops just outside reserves they are engaged primarily to serve);
R. v. Spence, [2005] S.C.J. No. 74, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458 (trial judges are not obligated to explore the
interracial nature of crime during challenge for cause procedure whenever victim and accused are
of different races). And two Evidence cases with a Criminal Law and Charter component: see R. v.
Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, 2005 SCC 76 [hereinafter “Henry”] (Charter s. 13, right against selfincrimination through prior testimony, whether right applies at retrial to preclude cross-examination
of accused based on his testimony at first trial); R. v. Turcotte, [2005] S.C.J. No. 51, [2005] 2
S.C.R. 519 (Charter s. 7, right to silence, is right waived when a suspect answers some questions
such that the failure to answer others may be the subject of evidence). This was roughly the same
number of “criminal” Charter cases decided by the Court during the 2004 calendar year. See
Eugene Meehan, Supreme Court of Canada 2004 Year-In-Review available online:
<http://www.eugenemeehan.com/english/sccReview2004.asp>.
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done.”6 The main point of his speech was as clear as it was strong: stop
bringing spurious Charter applications. He forcefully argued that such
motions are unduly prolonging criminal trials, choking the justice
system and creating a backlog that is undermining public confidence in
the system and threatening the administration of justice.7
Anyone close to the criminal courts knows that these concerns are
justified. Criminal trials are indeed taking much longer to complete than
they did a generation ago and Charter litigation is the major cause. Poor
judgment by many criminal defence counsel on what Charter issues are
worth litigating, as well as a plodding and prolix approach by some in
advancing these claims, are undoubtedly a part of the problem, as
Justice Moldaver suggests.8 And, as he also noted, intransigent
prosecutors must shoulder some of the blame; so must trial judges who
fail to bring a quick end to frivolous Charter applications.9 Of course,
Justice Moldaver readily concedes that with the Charter some delays are
simply unavoidable. The reality is that litigating the constitutionality of
how the police acquired the evidence against an accused takes time. His
concern is with those delays that could be prevented if counsel were
more reasonable in assessing potential Charter claims.
My focus in this short paper will be on Justice Moldaver’s
suggestion that when it comes to criminal justice and the Charter the
governing principles are now firmly established and that the time for
experimentation has mostly come to an end. I will respond to that claim
by drawing on the Court’s Charter judgments from this past year. As
noted, there were very few constitutional cases that touched on criminal
law in 2005. At least superficially this would seem to support Justice
Moldaver’s claim. As will become obvious, however, the numbers alone
can be quite misleading. They tell only a very small part of the story.
6
Justice Moldaver delivered the Sopinka Lecture on Advocacy at the Criminal Lawyers
Association Annual Fall Conference, in Toronto, on October 22, 2005. See Christie Blatchford,
“Justice delayed, justice denied” The Globe and Mail (25 November 2003) A23, wherein large
portions of the original speech are reproduced, including the passage quoted here. The entire lecture
is reproduced in the Criminal Reports. See Hon. Justice Michael Moldaver, “Long Criminal Trials:
Masters of a System They Are Meant to Serve” (2005) 32 C.R. (6th) 316 [hereinafter “Moldaver”].
In the published version Justice Moldaver has backed away from some of stronger language used in
his original address. For example, the last sentence in the excerpt above was revised to read: “By
and large, the governing principles are now firmly established. And where that is so — where the
basic principles have been established — any further experimentation should generally be limited
to fine-tuning.” Id., at 322.
7
Moldaver, id., at 320-23.
8
Id.
9
Id., at 319-20.
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What matters much more in drawing out larger lessons from last year’s
cases and forecasting future trends is the substance of those decisions
that the Court did hand down. Here, my focus will be on three of the
Court’s judgments: Pires & Lising,10 Henry11 and Orbanski & Elias.12
Together these three cases serve to illustrate that despite occasional
claims to the contrary by observers like Justice Moldaver, the reality is
that there continues to be much uncertainty surrounding a number of
very basic Charter issues relating to the criminal justice system.
In the process of responding to Justice Moldaver’s claim, the paper
will also take up the question of legal uncertainty in criminal Charter
litigation more generally. Ultimately, my claim is that, generally
speaking, there are two forms of uncertainty in this context. In Part II,
what I term “unavoidable” or even “necessary” uncertainty will be
considered. Here, our focus will be on how some degree of uncertainty
is inherent and even constructive when it comes to the interpretation of
the Charter’s open-ended and value-laden guarantees. In contrast, in
Part III, we will explore the very different implications that arise when
the law governing police powers is needlessly mired in uncertainty.
Here, our focus will be on the rules that empower the police to interfere
with individual liberty, as opposed to the Charter guarantees that are
suppose to place minimum constitutional limits on police authority. The
distinction is subtle but important. When it comes to the rules of police
empowerment, beyond respecting minimum Charter requirements, our
goals should equally be clarity and comprehensiveness. This is because
uncertainty about the basic contours of police authority poses a serious,
yet unnecessary, threat to the Charter rights of anyone who happens to
come into conflict with police power.13

10

Supra, note 5.
Supra, note 5.
12
Supra, note 5.
13
I do not at all intend to suggest that certainty is the ultimate goal. Given how many
actors (individuals, police, lawyers, judges) depend on clarity in the Court’s judgments and the
stakes for those involved, certainty is obviously a very important consideration. On the importance
of clear and coherent rules within the criminal process see generally Alan N. Young, “The Charter,
the Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitutionalization of the Investigative Process” in Jamie
Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 1.
Of course, substance also matters a great deal. Procedurally clear but substantively flawed laws can
occasion much injustice. Accordingly, the Court’s goal when operating in areas that implicate those
individual interests protected by the Charter’s legal rights guarantees must also be to safeguard
individuals from abuses of state power during the criminal investigative and adjudicative processes.
See generally James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and
the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 5-17.
11
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II. NECESSARY UNCERTAINTY: PIRES & LISING AND HENRY
Some uncertainty is of course inevitable in any constitutional system
that gives common law courts the primary responsibility for interpreting
a constitutional text on a case-by-case base. It is trite that in every case
within such a system the resolution of some questions will need to be
deferred until they are ripe for consideration in some future case. It
would seem that Justice Moldaver’s point is that when it comes to the
criminal justice system and the Charter most of the basic questions have
now been decided, they are settled; but are they? In this part of the paper
I intend to demonstrate that they are not.
First, even questions that seem settled aren’t always so. In part, the
long-term viability of any common law constitutional system very much
depends on the authority and willingness of its final court of appeal to
revisit established doctrine when experience has demonstrated that one
of its earlier judgments is either being misconstrued or was wrongly
decided.14 This seems especially true in a system such as ours in Canada
where the Constitution is considered to be a “living tree”.15
Just as important, for reasons going to its institutional integrity, the
Court must proceed with great caution before substantially revamping
established precedent or taking the drastic step of overruling an earlier
judgment. If the Court appears too eager to revisit established principles
then the authority of its judgments will be undermined and its
institutional integrity will needlessly suffer. In other words, the
institutional integrity of the Court would seem to depend both on its
willingness to reconsider its past decisions when the reasons for doing
so are compelling and the resolve to refrain from doing so when they are
not.
Contrary to claims that the time for Charter experimentation is over,
cases like Pires & Lising and Henry demonstrate that the dust is far
from settled, even when it comes to principles that may seem very well
established. In each of these cases the Court revisited decisions that it

14
Although it is difficult, try to imagine a world in which Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896) (which upheld school segregation based on the so-called “separate but equal” doctrine)
was never overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15
The “living tree” metaphor began its ascent into Canadian constitutional law under the
British North America Act. See Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124, at 136
(P.C.), per Viscount Sankey. The Supreme Court has continued to embrace this metaphor in the
Charter era. See e.g., Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155-56
[hereinafter “Hunter”].
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had handed down in the relative infancy of the Charter. In the former
case, Pires & Lising, the Court reaffirmed its prior judgment in order to
avoid any uncertainty that may have grown up around it because of
some important and related developments. In Henry, the Court took the
far more drastic step of actually overruling its earlier decision. As we go
forward in this Part the important point to remember is that some
uncertainty is inevitable and even necessary within our constitutional
system.
1. The Judgment in Pires & Lising
Let us begin with Pires & Lising. The appellants were charged with
several drug-related offences. By way of pre-trial Charter motion they
challenged the admissibility of certain wiretap evidence that had been
obtained pursuant to the authority of several judicial authorizations. On
this motion they sought leave to cross-examine the police officer who
had sworn the affidavit to obtain judicial approval for the wiretaps. The
trial judge refused leave, concluding that the preconditions set down by
the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in R. v. Garofoli16 were not met.
The appellants challenged that ruling unsuccessfully before the British
Columbia Court of Appeal and then again before the Supreme Court.
The apellants’ main argument was that the preconditions on the
ability to cross-examine a warrant affiant set down in Garofoli —
decided in 1990 — should be reconsidered. In Garofoli, in the course of
some rather long reasons that dealt with a great many issues, Sopinka J.
had indicated that before cross-examination would be permitted:
A basis must be shown by the accused for the view that the crossexamination will elicit testimony tending to discredit the existence of
one of the preconditions to the authorization, as for example the
existence of reasonable and probable grounds.17

It was the need for leave to cross-examine that the appellants challenged
in Pires & Lising. (In the alternative, they argued that under the
Garofoli test they should have been permitted to cross-examine in any
event.)
The appellants pointed to a number of important developments since
Garofoli in arguing in favour of a more relaxed approach. For example,
16
17

[1990] S.C.J. No. 115, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421 [hereinafter “Garofoli”].
Id., at 1465.
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there was the repeal of the automatic exclusionary rule that was in the
former section 178.16 of the Code. It had imposed the burden on the
Crown to establish the existence of a valid authorization. Failing that,
the evidence obtained would be excluded. With the 1993 amendments
the legal burden shifted squarely to the accused to show a Charter
violation and to justify exclusion under section 24(2).18 The appellants
argued that this shift in onus necessitated a relaxation of the initial
threshold requirement that must be met before cross-examination is
permitted. Absent that, the appellants argued that Garofoli, combined
with the 1993 amendments, would undermine the ability of accused
persons to challenge the sub-facial validity of wiretap authorizations.
In addition, there were three larger trends in the post-Garofoli
jurisprudence that the Appellants emphasized in arguing for a relaxation
of the requirements: first, clear and express recognition by the Court of
the critical importance of cross-examination;19 second, developments
with respect to the lower standard for the admissibility of defence
evidence;20 and, finally, the well established notion that rights require
remedies and an argument that maintaining Garofoli’s requirements to
cross-examine would impede access to the Charter’s remedial scheme.
Before moving on to address how the Court responded to this claim,
it is worthwhile to pause here and emphasize that the argument
advanced by the Appellants was not without merit. A great deal has
indeed changed since Garofoli was decided. The idea that the Supreme
Court might be prepared to reconsider its judgment in that case a mere
15 years after it was decided was not at all far-fetched. For example, it
was only 11 years between the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v.
Landry21 (decided in 1986) defining the common law requirements for
entry into private premises to effect an arrest and the Court’s decision in
R. v. Feeney22 embracing the warrant requirement it had specifically
rejected in Landry. In changing course in Feeney the Court had

18
This was because the normal rules governing Charter applications then applied. In other
words, the applicant bears the burden on a balance of probabilities. See R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J.
No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 [hereinafter “Collins”].
19
See e.g., R. v. Lyttle, [2004] S.C.J. No. 8, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, at para. 41.
20
See e.g., R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at para. 43.
21
[1986] S.C.J. No. 10, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 45.
22
[1997] S.C.J. No. 49, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 [hereinafter “Feeney”].
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emphasized subsequent developments under section 8 of the Charter
relating to the protection of privacy.23
In Pires & Lising the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the
appellants’ claim that developments over the intervening years
warranted a change in approach. Although the legal burden had shifted
the evidentiary burden had remained firmly on the Crown. Once a
search is challenged, it is the Crown that must show the existence of a
facially valid authorization. Failing that, the search or seizure will be
presumed to be unreasonable and the applicant will have discharged its
legal burden.24 In other words, as a practical matter those challenging the
validity of a search warrant are not worse off than they were before the
amendments. This is especially true because of developments over the
intervening years that actually work to the advantage of accused persons
when it comes to making a preliminary showing that cross-examination
is necessary. Today, unlike when Garofoli was decided, accused persons
can quite easily gain access to the affidavit sworn to obtain a warrant,25
as well as other investigatory materials that will shed considerable light
on whether or not cross-examination of the affiant might prove useful in
mounting a challenge to the warrant.26 As the Court points out, “the
defence does not arrive empty-handed at the evidentiary hearing”.27
The Court concluded that the appellant’s reliance on cases that
emphasize the importance of cross-examination and the ability of the
defence to introduce evidence at trial was misplaced. The basis for a
sub-facial challenge to a warrant is actually quite narrow. The reviewing
judge does not conduct a de novo hearing. Rather, she is limited to a
consideration of whether there was any basis upon which the
authorizing judge could be satisfied that the relevant statutory
preconditions were satisfied.28 For the Court these differences in context
were important. Given the limited basis for conducting a sub-facial
23

Id., at paras. 42-51.
A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter,
which as a practical matter means that the burden shifts to the Crown. See Collins, supra, note 18.
25
See R. v. Dersch, [1990] S.C.J. No. 113, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1505 (holding that once the
admission of the evidence is challenged an accused is entitled to access to the authorization packet
submitted by police in order to permit full answer and defence).
26
See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (holding that the
defence is entitled to all material in the possession or control of the Crown that is potentially
relevant to the case whether favourable to the accused or not).
27
Pires & Lising, supra, note 5, at para. 27.
28
See generally Garofoli, supra, note 16, at 1451-52. See also R. v. Araujo, [2000] S.C.J.
No. 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992.
24
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attack on a search pursuant to warrant, the need for some preliminary
showing by an accused that cross-examination might be fruitful remains
important. As Charron J. noted for the Court in Pires & Lising, “[t]here
is no point in permitting cross-examination if there is no reasonable
likelihood that it will impact on the question of the admissibility of the
evidence”.29 Garofoli set down a leave requirement in order to avoid
valuable court time being wasted by the exploration of what is
ultimately irrelevant evidence. In other words, the “Garofoli threshold
test is all about relevancy. If the proposed cross-examination is not
relevant to a material issue, within the narrow scope of the review of
admissibility, there is no reason to permit it”.30 Any other course would
ignore concerns about the prolixity of proceedings and, in many cases,
the need to protect informants. For the Court these concerns were as
important today as they were in 1990. As a result, it left Garofoli’s leave
requirement intact.
Nevertheless, the Court sensibly seized the opportunity to provide
some guidance on what sort of showing is required by the leave
requirement set down in Garofoli. As noted, the Court in that case had
dealt with a host of different section 8 Charter issues. In the result, it had
concluded that Garofoli had wrongly been denied the opportunity to
cross-examine the affiant in his case.31 Possibly due to the brevity of the
Court’s reasons in Garofoli on this discrete issue, over the intervening
years trial courts had been rather inconsistent in applying the leave
requirement.32 This practical reality would have no doubt informed the
decision of counsel for Pires and Lising to challenge Garofoli. For
similar reasons, the time was also right for the Court to revisit the issue
and provide some needed guidance — which is exactly what it did:
… in determining whether cross-examination should be permitted,
counsel and the reviewing judge must remain strictly focused on the
question to be determined on a Garofoli review — whether there is a
basis upon which the authorizing judge could grant the order. If the
proposed cross-examination is not likely to assist in the determination
of this question, it should not be permitted. However, if the proposed

29

Pires & Lising, supra, note 5, at para. 31.
Id.
31
Garofoli, supra, note 16, at 1466.
32
See Michal Fairburn, “Litigating the Warranted Search: A Practical Overview” (Paper
presented to the Fourth Symposium on Issues in Search and Seizure Law in Canada, November
2005) (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School, Professional Development Program, 2005), at 10-12.
30
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cross-examination falls within the narrow confines of this review, it is
not necessary for the defence to go further and demonstrate that crossexamination will be successful in discrediting one or more of the
statutory preconditions for the authorization. Such a strict standard
was rejected in Garofoli. A reasonable likelihood that it will assist the
court to determine a material issue is all that must be shown.33

Quite sensibly, this passage is followed by a number of specific
examples from the case law regarding the sort of circumstances in
which cross-examination should be permitted.34 The Court closes off by
carefully reviewing the facts in this case in order to explain why the
appellants had failed to meet the standard, providing another concrete
example of the standard in application.35
Returning briefly to my larger point, the Court’s decision in Pires &
Lising provides a useful example for our purposes here. The Supreme
Court had set down the threshold test in Garofoli only 15 years earlier.
Nevertheless, experience over the intervening years revealed much
confusion regarding how onerous the Supreme Court intended the
threshold requirement to be. In addition, the constitutional landscape
had changed considerably in the interim. Given these circumstances it is
understandable why counsel for Pires and Lising thought the time might
be right to try and convince the Court to reconsider its earlier decision.
Similarly, the Court was also justified in deciding to revisit its earlier
judgment and provide some needed clarification.
Pires & Lising effectively illustrates that even well established
constitutional principles benefit from periodic review and renewal.
Subjecting long-standing doctrine to continued debate in light of
contemporary circumstances ensures the Charter’s vitality and is in
keeping with the “living tree” theory of our Constitution. Of course, this
sort of review will occasionally lead the Court to conclude that a prior
judgment was wrongly decided and needs to be overturned. This is
exactly what happened in Henry.

33

Pires & Lising, supra, note 5, at para. 40.
Id., at paras. 42 through 44. See also id., at para. 69.
35
Id., at paras. 49-68. Here, the appellants emphasized a single statement in the affidavit
which did serve to create a false impression on a point that the trial judge, the British Columbia
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court all concluded was rather inconsequential to the issuance of
the authorization. There was an innocent explanation for the misstatement and therefore no real
basis to suggest that it was deliberate. Where there is some basis to think that a false statement was
included with the intention to mislead the Court indicated that leave to cross-examine should be
granted. That was not this case. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
34
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2. The Judgment in Henry
The Supreme Court has considered section 13 of the Charter on a
number of prior occasions.36 In Henry that guarantee was again front and
centre. It reads:
A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have
any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in
any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the
giving of contradictory evidence.

Unfortunately, the Court’s past decisions interpreting section 13 drew
two difficult distinctions that have sometimes proven elusive in
application.
First, what exactly constitutes “any other proceedings”? Some cases
are easy. For example, protection of an accused person from use of his
evidence at the preliminary inquiry or trial of a third party is obvious.
More difficult is the situation of an accused who testifies at his own trial
which then either results in a mistrial or culminates in a successful
appeal. Does the guarantee protect that accused from use of his prior
testimony at any subsequent retrial? In Dubois37 the Supreme Court held
that a retrial for the same offence falls within the meaning of the words
“any other proceedings”. But what about the accused person who
testifies on a voir dire, can that evidence then be used by the Crown at
the trial proper or is the voir dire a separate proceeding? Although that
issue has never directly come before the Court, it has signalled in rather
strong obiter that the voir dire and trial proper should be considered
separate proceedings for section 13 Charter purposes.38
Second, once the guarantee in section 13 of the Charter is engaged,
what does it actually protect against? On its face, the provision speaks
of not having evidence “used to incriminate … except for a prosecution
for perjury or for the giving of contradictory evidence”. Over the last 20
years the Court has experienced considerable difficulty giving this
36

See R. v. Dubois, [1985] S.C.J. No. 69, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350 [hereinafter “Dubois”]; R. v.
Mannion, [1986] S.C.J. No. 53, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 272 [hereinafter “Mannion”]; R. v. Kuldip, [1990]
S.C.J. No. 126, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 618; R. v. Noël, [2002] S.C.J. No. 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 433
[hereinafter “Noël”]; R. v. Allen, [2003] S.C.J. No. 16, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 223 [hereinafter “Allen”].
37
Id.
38
See R. v. Darrach, [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, at para. 66. As a practical
matter the issue has not arisen because there is established case law that predates the Charter which
holds that an accused’s testimony on a voir dire is not admissible on the trial proper. See Erven v.
The Queen, [1978] S.C.J. No. 114, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 926, at 932.
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language consistent and coherent meaning. Here is a brief summary of
the Court’s prior rulings that take up this issue:
•

In Dubois the accused was being retried following a successful
appeal. The Court held that section 13 precluded the Crown from
introducing as part of its own case a transcript of the accused’s
evidence from his first trial.

•

In Mannion the Crown cross-examined the accused on
inconsistencies between his testimony at his first trial and the
answers he gave when testifying at his retrial. The Court held that
section 13 precluded the Crown from engaging in this sort of
questioning.

•

In Kuldip the Crown had again cross-examined the accused on
inconsistencies between his testimony at his first trial and the
answers he gave when testifying at his retrial. This time the Court
drew a distinction between use of prior testimony for the purpose of
“incriminating” an accused, which the Court said is to establish guilt
and runs afoul of section 13, and use for “impeachment” purposes,
which the Court said is elicited merely to contradict and undermine
credibility.

•

In Noël the Crown had cross-examined an accused about testimony
he had given at an accomplice’s trial. Here, the Court acknowledged
the difficulty created by its earlier decision in Kuldip and the
distinction drawn between incrimination and impeachment. In Noël
the Court held that section 13 provides that, when an accused
testifies at trial, he or she cannot be cross-examined on prior
testimony to impeach credibility unless the trial judge is satisfied
that there is no realistic danger that the prior testimony could be
used to incriminate the accused.39

The interpretive challenge with section 13 of the Charter that
seemed to finally come to a head in Noël was the difficult distinction
that the Court had attempted to draw between incrimination and
impeachment. A difference that was better understood in theory than it
was in practice. The reality is that whenever the Crown is attempting to

39
It should be noted that Allen, supra, note 36, involves a straightforward application of
the principle from Noël.
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use an accused’s prior testimony it is doing so in order to advance its
case against him with the ultimate objective of proving his guilt.40 For
this reason the distinction between incrimination and impeachment has
at times seemed rather artificial.
In Henry it was the impossibility of drawing such a distinction that
the appellants hoped to make the focus of their appeal. Both men had
been convicted of murder at their first trial. They successfully appealed
against those convictions. At their retrial, which pre-dated the Supreme
Court’s decision in Noël, both men testified in their own defence and
each gave a substantially different account than they had at their first
trial. The Crown cross-examined them on the differences in their
respective stories from the first trial to the second and both men were
again convicted. The discrete issue before the Supreme Court of Canada
was whether the cross-examination at their subsequent trial ran afoul of
section 13 of the Charter.
The Court began its judgment by reiterating the purpose behind
section 13 of the Charter, as articulated in Dubois: “to protect
individuals from being indirectly compelled to incriminate themselves,
to ensure that the Crown will not be able to do indirectly that which
s. 11(c) prohibits”.41 It contrasted that purpose with what it characterized
as the position being advanced by the appellants, which it described as
follows: “that an accused can volunteer one story at his or her first trial,
have it rejected by the jury, then after obtaining a retrial on an unrelated
ground of appeal volunteer a different and contradictory story to a jury
differently constituted in the hope of a better result because the second
jury is kept in the dark about the inconsistencies.”42 Through this
description of the appellants’ position the Court made clear at the outset
that this case was not going to turn on the impossible distinction
between incrimination and impeachment.

40
See Hamish Stewart & Erica Bussey, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Too
Strong, Too Weak, or Both?” (2005) 9 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 369, at 377-78; M. Naeem Rauf,
“Section 13 of the Charter and the Use of an Accused’s Prior Testimony: A Reply to David
Doherty and Ronald Delisle” (1991) 4 C.R. (4th) 42, at 48; Don Stuart, Charter Justice and
Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 2005), at 467-68. See also R. v.
Kuldip, [1988] O.J. No. 40, 40 C.C.C. (3d) 11, at 23 C.C.C. (C.A.) where Martin J. acknowledged
this reality when the case was before the Court of Appeal.
41
This passage can be found in Dubois, supra, note 36, at 358. See also Kuldip, supra,
note 36, at 629. It is reproduced in Henry in a couple of places. See Henry, supra, note 5, at paras. 2
and 22.
42
Henry, supra, note 5, at para. 2.
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Rather, the Court in Henry seized the opportunity to acknowledge
that its earlier judgments dealing with section 13 had been less than
consistent. The Court attributed this confusion to a failure on its part to
keep the purpose of the guarantee at the forefront in its analysis and to
instead focus on the particular purpose for which the evidence was
being used (i.e., incrimination versus impeachment). With this change
of emphasis the Court proceeded to draw out yet another distinction, the
difference between the accused who was merely a witness in a prior
proceeding and who was therefore truly compelled to testify and the
accused who chose to take the stand at an earlier trial and thereby
voluntarily gave up the absolute right not to be compelled to testify
which is guaranteed by section 11(c) of the Charter. For the Henry
Court the sensible solution to all of the confusion that had grown up
around section 13 was to return to first principles, the underlying
purpose of the guarantee — affording protection against compelled selfincrimination. With that purpose in mind, the Court proceeded to survey
its past judgments.
In the end, the Court concluded that for the most part its earlier
decisions could be reconciled with the underlying purpose of section 13
of the Charter. There were some exceptions, however, that needed to be
reconsidered. The Court acknowledged that it should not depart from its
own precedents unless there are compelling reasons for doing so,43
noting that it should be “particularly careful before reversing a
precedent where the effect is to diminish Charter protection”.44
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that with respect to developments
relating to section 13 of the Charter there were very good reasons for
doing just that.
43
Henry, supra, note 5, at 44. The Court cited a number of its prior decisions in support of
this proposition. See R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654; R. v. Chaulk, [1990]
S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 [hereinafter “Chaulk”]; R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 22,
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 740; R. v. Robinson, [1996] S.C.J. No. 32, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683; Clark v. Canadian
National Railway, [1988] S.C.J. No. 90, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680. It then proceeded to list a number of
examples where the Court in fact took this significant step. See United States v. Burns, [2001]
S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights
Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 80, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489; Brooks v. Canadian Safeway Ltd., [1989]
S.C.J. No. 42, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219.
44
Henry, supra, note 5, at para. 44. See also R. v. Bernard, [1988] S.C.J. No. 96, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 833, at 860-61 (Dickson C.J., dissenting) indicating that the principle of certainty and the
institutional limits imposed on the law-making functions of the courts should similarly constrain the
Court from overruling a past decision where the effect would be to expand criminal liability. Chief
Justice Dickson’s comments in Bernard were later adopted by a majority of the Court. See Chaulk,
id., at 1353.
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Beginning with Mannion, the Court concluded that it must be
overturned for a number of reasons. It will be remembered that Mannion
was the case in which the accused was cross-examined at a retrial using
evidence he had given at his first trial. In that decision the Court drew
no distinction between incrimination and impeachment. Rather, it
simply held that the cross-examination of Mr. Mannion on
inconsistencies between his evidence in both proceedings served to
incriminate him and ran afoul of section 13 of the Charter.45
In Henry, the Court noted that the decision in Mannion failed to take
into account the purpose underlying section 13 of the Charter, protecting
against compelled self-incrimination. Second, to maintain Mannion
would allow individuals who were not in any sense “compelled” to
testify at their former trial, like the two appellants in Henry, to take
advantage of the Court’s holding in Noël in a manner that would require
a cumbersome and unworkable application of the incrimination/
impeachment distinction. The third and, according to the Court, most
important reason for overruling Mannion was to be better able to protect
the position of those who are truly compelled. The Court reasoned that
treating accused persons who are required to testify as witnesses in an
earlier proceeding the same as accused persons who choose to testify at
successive trials lessens the protection for the former. Noël’s “no
possibility” test may seem sensible when applied to those who were
compelled to testify but results in absurd outcomes when applied in
cases like Henry. Such a result is not consistent with the underlying
purpose of section 13 of the Charter. For all these reasons the Court in
Henry decided to take the unusual step of expressly overruling
Mannion.
Next the Court turned its attention to Kuldip. It too involved the
cross-examination of an accused at his second trial based on evidence he
had given at his first trial. It will be remembered that this is the case in
which the Court first introduced the impeachment versus incrimination
distinction. This is a distinction that the Henry Court quite sensibly
concluded was no longer tenable. The Court noted that to the extent that
Kuldip allowed for the cross-examination of an accused on his
inconsistent testimony volunteered at his first trial, it should be
affirmed. In contrast, to the extent it had shielded such an accused from

45

See Mannion, supra, note 36, at 280.
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cross-examination that was said to “incriminate” the decision was
overruled.
Finally, the Court briefly revisited its recent decision in Noël. In that
case the accused was cross-examined by the Crown at his own trial
based on testimony he was compelled to give at the earlier trial of his
accomplice. For the Court, this represented a classic example of the sort
of compulsion that section 13 of the Charter is principally aimed at
protecting against. As a result, the decision was easily reconciled with
the Henry Court’s renewed emphasis on compulsion as the linchpin of
section 13. Nevertheless, Noël had struggled to maintain the awkward
distinction between incrimination and impeachment that had found its
genesis in Kuldip. For the Henry Court it made little sense to try and
maintain that distinction any longer. Although the Court acknowledged
that the plain language in section 13 provided support for maintaining it,
it understandably conceded that, “experience has demonstrated the
difficulty in practice of working with that distinction”.46 The Court
therefore concluded that “prior compelled evidence should, under s. 13
as under s. 5(2) [of the Canada Evidence Act], be treated as inadmissible
in evidence against the accused, even for the ostensible purpose of
challenging his or her credibility, and be restricted (in the words of s. 13
itself) to a ‘prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory
evidence’”. 47
In the result, given that both appellants in Henry had been crossexamined on the testimony that they had volunteered at their first trial
the necessary element of compulsion was lacking. In other words,
section 13 of the Charter no longer applies to accused persons who
testify at successive trials. An accused who chooses to forego their right
to silence at an earlier trial is not compelled in that proceeding. As a
result, should that accused again choose to testify at a retrial there is
nothing about permitting them to then be cross-examined on any
inconsistencies between their evidence at both trials that is contrary to
the goal behind section 13 of the Charter.
Returning momentarily to our larger enterprise, Henry provides an
excellent example of how even established principles can gradually be
eroded by the lessons of experience. Less than 20 years had elapsed
between Mannion and Henry. Nevertheless, within that comparatively

46
47

Henry, supra, note 5, at para. 50.
Id., at para. 50.
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short period an idea that had managed to gain the support of a
unanimous seven-member panel of the Supreme Court had fallen into
disfavour. Henry is an example that aptly demonstrates that within a
common law constitutional system such as ours even well-established
principles are continually open to being challenged and, if proven
wanting, overruled. Of course, even with this most recent development
one is hard-pressed to now claim that the debate surrounding the
meaning of section 13 has finally ended and that the time for
experimentation is forever over.
There is much to be thankful for about the Court’s decision in Henry.
First, the decision provides a useful reminder of the underlying purpose
behind section 13 of the Charter and makes a good effort to rationalize the
established case law in light of that larger objective. Second, the case
sensibly eliminates the artificial and practically unworkable incrimination
versus impeachment distinction. Unfortunately, in the process of
redressing some of the confusion created by its past decisions the Court
does manage to create some uncertainty of its own.
Most significantly, the Court expressly reaffirms its prior decision
in Dubois.48 This is the case involving a retrial at which the Crown
tendered as part of its own case a transcript of the accused’s evidence at
his first trial. The accused chose not to testify at the retrial. In rejecting
the notion that Dubois also had to be overruled, the Court shifted its
focus from the absence of any compulsion at the earlier proceeding to
the circumstances of the new trial. It reasoned that:
The rationale underlying Dubois for extending s. 13 protection to an
accused in a retrial, however, was because when a “new” trial is
ordered the accused is entitled not to testify at all. Thus, to allow the
Crown simply to file the testimony of the accused given at the prior
trial (now overturned) would permit the Crown indirectly to compel
the accused to testify at the retrial where s. 11(c) of the Charter would
not permit such compelled self-incrimination directly. The Crown
must prove its case without recruiting the accused to self49
incriminate.

48
49

Henry, supra, note 5, at paras. 39-40.
Id., at para. 39.
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As Professor Hamish Stewart has argued, this effort to distinguish
Dubois seems less than persuasive.50 If “compulsion” is the key, then
section 13 of the Charter should serve as no barrier to the admission of
testimony by an accused that was volunteered at an earlier trial or, by
analogy, at an unrelated trial or on a voir dire. If the reason that
admitting prior testimony in subsequent proceedings is offensive is
because there is something inherently unfair about allowing the Crown
to gain an advantage from some flaw in the earlier trial (that led to a
mistrial or a successful appeal) then compulsion would not seem to be
the animating concern after all. But, if this is true, then why do these
concerns about unfairness not persist when the accused then makes the
choice to take the stand at the second trial? How does that subsequent
choice serve to vitiate the unfairness of giving the Crown a tactical
advantage that it would not otherwise have had but for the legally
flawed first trial?51 These are important questions that the Henry Court
does not answer. Accordingly, there would seem to be much room for
future development in this important area of Charter law.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in both Pires & Lising and Henry
serve to remind us of an important point about law in a common law
constitutional system such as ours. That is, even principles that may
seem well established are always open to being reconsidered in light of
experience. This is because, as Holmes observed, the “life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience”.52 The notion that we will reach a
point in any area of law where all questions are settled, especially an
area as contested and challenging as the interpretation of broadly
worded and value laden constitutional guarantees, is simply not realistic.
In other words, some level of uncertainty is not only inevitable but also
essential to the vitality of our constitutional order. As Dickson J. noted
on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court in Hunter v. Southam,53 our
Constitution must “be capable of growth and development over time to
meet new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its
framers”.54 In short, the dust will never settle. The document will always
remain a work in progress.

50
See Hamish Stewart, “Henry in the Supreme Court of Canada: Reorienting the s. 13
Right against Self-incrimination” (2006) 34 C.R. (6th) 112.
51
Id., at 116-18.
52
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1923), at ch. 1.
53
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
54
Id., at 155.
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III. AVOIDABLE UNCERTAINTY: ORBANSKI & ELIAS
To this point, our focus has been on what I term “unavoidable” or even
“necessary” uncertainty. In this section we shift gears and focus on an
area that although related is actually quite different than the subject of
constitutional interpretation more generally. This is the law relating to
police powers. Obviously, the meaning of many of the Charter’s Legal
Rights guarantees will bear on police investigative powers by imposing
constitutional limits on police authority. That is, however, a very
different question than the source and scope of police power. Here, it is
essential to remember another important passage from Hunter v.
Southam that in recent years has too often been forgotten. Before
identifying the larger purpose behind section 8 of the Charter, or
elaborating on its requirements, Dickson J. indicated:
I begin with the obvious. The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms is a purposive document. Its purpose is to guarantee and to
protect, within the limits of reason, the enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms it enshrines. It is intended to constrain governmental action
inconsistent with those rights and freedoms; it is not in itself an
authorization for governmental action. In the present case this
means . . . that in guaranteeing the right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures, s. 8 acts as a limitation on
whatever powers of search and seizure the federal or provincial
governments already and otherwise possess. It does not in itself confer
any powers, even of “reasonable” search and seizure, on these
governments.55

Although this point seems obvious, it is important. The Charter and the
Supreme Court’s judgments under it were never intended to serve as a
source of new and previously unimagined police powers.
This is not to say that the Charter was not expected to have some
impact on the criminal investigative process. From the beginning, it was
apparent to everyone that its effects would undoubtedly be great. A
number of its provisions speak directly to the regulation of police
authority. What was not apparent at the outset was the pressure that it
would place on the courts to create new police powers. The Charter —
largely because of its exclusionary remedy — served to reveal serious
deficiencies in the scattered collection of statutory and common law

55

Id., at 156-57.
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rules which make up the law of police powers in Canada. Although, at
times, the Supreme Court has been sceptical about acting to correct
these shortcomings,56 in recent years it has taken a much more proactive
approach in filling gaps in police authority.
The Court has employed a variety of law-making devices over the
last 20 years to essentially make up for shortcomings in police powers.57
For example, it has used what has come to be known interchangeably as
the “Waterfield test”58 or the “ancillary powers doctrine” to recognize
new police investigative powers at “common-law”.59 Similarly, it has
essentially abandoned the rule of strict construction for statutory
enactments that authorize state intrusions on individual liberty that had
long dominated in the era before the Charter.60 Instead, the Court has
routinely read language into legislation to make up for deficiencies in

56

See id. See also R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at 56-57.
See generally James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police
Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J.1, at 17-48 [Stribopoulos, “In Search of
Dialogue”].
58
See R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659 (Ct. Crim. App.) [hereinafter “Waterfield”].
That case developed a test for assessing whether a police officer was acting in the “execution of his
duty” in order to determine the potential culpability of an accused charged with the offence of
obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty. That test was transformed into a means of
recognizing new police investigative powers by the Supreme Court of Canada in its controversial
judgment in R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 [hereinafter “Dedman”]
where the Court recognized at “common-law” a police power to conduct sobriety check-stops of
motorists. It has since used the test on two other occasions. In R. v. Godoy, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85,
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 311 to create a police power to enter private residences in response to disconnected
911 calls. Then again in R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 to recognize a police
power to detain suspects for criminal investigative purposes.
59
For a more detailed description and critique of these developments see James
Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later” (2003) 41 Alta. L.
Rev. 335, at 349-55. [Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment?”]. See also Tim Quigley, “Brief
Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v. Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 935.
60
Before the Charter, the Supreme Court had recognized that when dealing with such a
statute, “that if real ambiguities are found, or doubts of substance arise . . . then the statute should
be applied in such a manner as to favour the person against whom it is sought to be enforced”.
Marcotte v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1974] S.C.J. No. 142, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 108, at
115. This principle had been applied equally to circumstances where the law encroached on
individual liberty (see R. v. Noble, [1977] S.C.J. No. 68, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 632, at 638; Beatty v.
Kozak, [1958] S.C.J. No. 9, [1958] S.C.R. 177, at 190, affg (1957), 7 D.L.R. (2d) 88 (Sask. C.A.);
Shim v. R., [1938] S.C.R. 378, at 380-81) or property interests (see Laidlaw v. Metropolitan
Toronto [1978] S.C.J. No. 32, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 736, at 748; Prince George (City) v. Payne, [1977]
S.C.J. No. 53, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 458, at 463; Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] S.C.J. No. 50, [1999] 3
S.C.R. 199, at 218; R. v. Colet, [1981] S.C.J. No. 2, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 2, at 11).
57
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formal police powers.61 In Orbanski & Elias we find the Court blending
both of these law-making devices together in order to confer upon
police a power that is not expressly granted by statute. Amazingly, this
implied power is then used by the Court to effect an override of what is
an express Charter right!
At issue in Orbanksi & Elias (separate cases heard and decided
together) was the scope of police authority when conducting a roadside
sobriety check-stop. In particular, whether the police are authorized to
ask a driver about her prior alcohol consumption or request that he or
she participate in roadside sobriety tests without first appraising the
driver of his or her right to counsel guaranteed by section 10(b) of the
Charter. Given established case law, the Crown readily conceded that
there had been a “detention” in each of these cases for section 10
Charter purposes.62 Similarly, there was no doubt that in neither case did
the police properly comply with their informational obligations under
section 10(b). The only issue then was whether these section 10(b)
violations were justified under section 1 of the Charter. Of course, in
order for this to be the case the override must be “prescribed by law”.63
As a result, the legal authority to question detained motorists and
request that they participate in roadside sobriety tests was the focus of
this appeal.
Both cases originated in Manitoba. At the time,64 although
legislation in the province conferred express authority on police officers
to stop motorists it did not expressly mention any power to question

61
See generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 57, at 30-41. For
example, the Court read a police power to break into private premises to install and maintain
listening devices into the Criminal Code scheme governing wiretaps. See R. v. Lyons, [1984] S.C.J.
No. 63, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 633 and Reference re: Judicature Act (Alberta), s. 27(1), [1984] S.C.J. No.
64, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 697. It also read a power on the part of teachers and school administrators to
search into a provincial Education Act that was entirely silent as to the existence of such a power.
See R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393. It also read a power to detain
suspected alimentary canal smugglers at ports of entry for extended periods (until they provide a
urine sample or defecate under state supervision) into a provision in the Customs Act which simply
refers to a power to “search”. See R. v. Monney, [1999] S.C.J. No. 18, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652.
62
See Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at para. 2. See R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at 641-44; R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 64750 [hereinafter “Thomsen”]; R. v. Hufsky, [1988] S.C.J. No. 30, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621, at 631-32;
R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] S.C.J. No. 53, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257.
63
Charter, supra, note 1, s. 1.
64
Since the time of Orbanski & Elias’ respective stops, Manitoba amended its provincial
Highway Traffic Act to expressly override the right to counsel at the roadside. See Highway Traffic
Act, S.M. 1985-86, c. 3, s. 76.(6).
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drivers or request that they participate in roadside sobriety tests.65
Nevertheless, for the majority, Charron J. emphasized the “operating
requirements”66 of the “interlocking scheme of federal and provincial
legislation”67 that governs all aspects of motor vehicle travel. Given the
authority provided by that scheme for police to stop motorists and check
on their sobriety, she reasoned that the power to ask drivers questions
about their alcohol consumption and request that they perform sobriety
tests arose by necessary implication.68
With respect to the scope of these implied police powers, Charron J.
invoked the common law as a guide on their potential limits.69 She
quoted with approval from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal
that had dealt with the scope of police power to check the sobriety of
drivers at the roadside: “a procedure cannot be reasonable … unless it
can be performed at the site of the detention, with dispatch, with no
danger to the safety of the detainee and with minimal inconvenience to
the detainee.”70 She then turned to the actual facts of the two appeals
before the Court, emphasizing throughout that the limits on police
authority in this context necessarily require a “case-specific inquiry”.71
In other words, the exact contours of police authority will vary from
case to case. According to the majority, this is unavoidable because it
“is both impossible to predict all the aspects of such encounters and
impractical to legislate exhaustive details as to how they must be
conducted”.72
Next, the majority turned to whether these implied powers could be
reconciled with both the informational and implementation requirements
of section 10(b). In other words, did these powers necessarily override
the right to counsel? In Thomsen the Court had held that section 254(2)
of the Criminal Code, the provision authorizing police officers to make

65

See Highway Traffic Act, S.M. 1985-86, c. 3, s. 76.(1).
Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at paras. 37, 39.
67
Id., at para. 27.
68
Id., at para. 43.
69
See id., at para. 45. In particular, she quoted from Dedman, supra, note 58, where the
Court in assessing whether the roadblock stop at issue in that case was justified under the second
prong of the Waterfield test had probed whether that power was “necessary for the carrying out of
the particular police duty and it must be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the liberty
interfered with and the importance of the public purpose served by the interference”. Id., at 35.
70
R. v. Ratelle, [1996] O.J. No. 372, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 58, at 73 (C.A.).
71
Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at paras. 47, 49-50.
72
Id., at para. 45.
66
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an ALERT breath demand at the roadside where they suspect a driver
has alcohol in his body, by necessary implication limited the right to
counsel.73 Reasoning by analogy, the majority easily concluded that the
screening procedures that are designed to furnish the grounds for such a
demand must also do the same.74 The majority failed to acknowledge
that from a technological standpoint much had changed since Thomsen
was decided in 1988. The justification for finding an implied override of
the right to counsel in that case was the impracticality of implementing
that right at the roadside. Since then cellular phones have become
commonplace, making the suggestion that Thomsen was controlling on
the practical need for an override far from compelling.
Nevertheless, with the required power in place and the need for an
override of the right to counsel established, the majority next turned to
its section 1 analysis. It very quickly concluded that the limitation on the
right to counsel in this context constituted a reasonable limit under
section 1 of the Charter.75
In a strongly worded dissent LeBel J., joined by Fish J., took
exception to the means by which the majority had found that there was a
“limit prescribed by law” on the right to counsel in these two cases. The
dissent criticized the majority’s “inventive use” of its “law-making
powers” in this case,76 an approach it characterized as “utilitarian” and
“based on expediency rather than legal principles”.77 The dissent
described the majority’s analysis as essentially reducing down to little
more than this: “Drunk driving is evil. Drunk driving is dangerous.
Drunk drivers must be swiftly taken off the road. If there is something
missing in the statute, let us read in the necessary powers. Failing that,
let us go to the common law and find or create something there.”78
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See Thomsen, supra, note 62.
Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at para. 52.
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The compelling state interest was supplied by the carnage caused by impaired drivers.
The rational connection was provided by the impracticality of implementing the right at the
roadside. Finally, when it came to the proportionality analysis the majority adopted the reasoning
from R. v. Milne, [1996] O.J. No. 1728, 107 C.C.C. (3d) 118, at 128-31 (C.A.), leave refused,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. xiii (note) which held that although the right to counsel does not apply during such
roadside encounters the results of questioning and sobriety testing may only be used as an
investigative tool to furnish grounds for a breath demand or arrest. A driver’s answers to police
questions or his or her performance on sobriety tests are not admissible on the trial proper. See
Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at paras. 54–58.
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Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at para. 70.
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Id., at para. 69.
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Id.
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The dissent in Orbanski & Elias also takes up the larger institutional
implications of the majority’s approach. It complains that the majority
conflates the process of creating a police power that encroaches on
Charter rights with the process of justifying it under section 1. The
dissent expresses alarm at the long-term implications of the majority’s
approach:
The doctrine would now be encapsulated in the principle that what the
police need, the police get, by judicial fiat if all else fails or if the
legislature finds the adoption of legislation to be unnecessary or
unwarranted. The courts would limit Charter rights to the full extent
necessary to achieve the purpose of meeting the needs of police. The
creation of and justification for the limit would arise out of an
initiative of the courts.79

The dissent in Orbanski & Elias represents the first sign of division
on the Court regarding the use of law-making devices since the
enterprise began 20 years ago in Dedman. In that case, Dickson C.J. had
expressed similar concerns in his dissenting judgment, reminding the
majority that it is “the function of the legislature, not the courts, to
authorize . . . police action that would otherwise be unlawful as a
violation of rights traditionally protected at common law.”80 The dissent
in Orbanski & Elias makes the very same observation before candidly
acknowledging a point that seems to escape the majority, that
“legislatures are better equipped to investigate and assess the need for
enhanced police powers and to integrate required changes into the
relevant statutory scheme as a whole”.81
Unfortunately, what ultimately emerges from the majority judgment
in Orbanski & Elias is an open-ended power on the part of the police to
do those things that are “reasonable” in the circumstances when carrying
out sobriety check-steps. Clear guidance and concrete limits on the
types of procedures permitted do not emerge from the judgment.
Instead, we are told that ascertaining whether or not the police had legal
authority to do what they did requires that every case be considered on
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Id., at para. 81.
Dedman, supra, note 58, at 15 (Dickson C.J.C., dissenting).
81
Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 5, at para. 82 (LeBel J., dissenting). On the institutional
shortcomings of courts as rule-making bodies and the comparative advantages of leaving the
creation of police powers to Parliament see generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra,
note 57, at 55-61.
80
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its own facts.82 This obviously gives police officers on the street wide
latitude in deciding how these potentially intrusive encounters will
unfold. In every case it will ultimately be up to a reviewing court to
determine ex post facto whether the police behaved appropriately or
unconstitutionally. Of course, if no one is charged the possibility that
police abuses will escape detection is great. Due to its own institutional
limitations, this is something the Court rarely acknowledges — largely
because these are cases that for the very same reason it almost never
sees.83
The net result of all this is considerable uncertainty. It is far from
clear what screening procedures police are entitled to carry out at the
roadside when conducting a sobriety check-stop. The majority’s claim
that police-motorist encounters are far too rich in their diversity to lend
themselves to clear, comprehensive and prospective legislative guidance
is not at all persuasive.84 Although no legislative scheme could ever
address every potential eventuality, statutory guidance could go a
considerable distance toward structuring and confining police discretion
in a manner that at least reduces the potential for abuse.85
Unfortunately, the majority’s judgment in Orbanski & Elias
continues a disturbing trend that has emerged in the post-Charter era.86
The Court has moved away from its traditional function of standing
between the individual and the state alert to see that any intrusion on
liberty is justified by law,87 in favour of a role that increasingly sees it
playing a law-making function that is better left for legislatures. Not
only does this breed uncertainty, it also contributes to an environment
that makes it far less likely that Parliament will ever have any incentive
to take the sort of comprehensive legislative action that is needed most
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See notes 69 through 72 and accompanying text.
On the low visibility of police abuses, see generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of
Dialogue”, supra, note 57, at 57-58. See also Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment?”, supra, note 59
at 344.
84
Supra, note 72 and accompanying text.
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See Kenneth C. Davis, Police Discretion (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1975) [Davis,
Police Discretion] who long ago recognized the dangers of too little and too much discretion,
arguing: “Unnecessary discretion must be eliminated. But discretion often is necessary and often
must be preserved. Necessary discretion must be properly confined, structured and checked.” Id., at
170. See more generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 57.
86
See generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 57.
87
This characterization of the role of the courts within the Anglo-Canadian constitutional
system finds its genesis in Lord Atkin’s now celebrated dissenting judgment in Liversidge v.
Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, at 244 (H.L.).
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in order to achieve greater clarity as to the scope and limits on police
power.
Legal uncertainty always comes at a price. When it comes to police
powers, however, the cost is especially high. This is because, as
Skolnick warns:
Whenever rules of constraint are ambiguous, they strengthen the very
conduct they are intended to restrain. Thus, the police officer already
committed to a conception of law as an instrument of order rather than
as an end in itself is likely to utilize the ambiguity of the rules of
restraint as a justification for testing or even violating them.88

In this context uncertainty actually cuts against the very purpose
underlying the Charter’s legal rights guarantees, that is, protecting
individuals from abuses of state power during the criminal investigative
process.89 Although when it comes to ascribing meaning to the Charter’s
guarantees, a certain amount of uncertainty is unavoidable and even
necessary, when it comes to the scope and limits on police power the
opposite is true.90 In this context everyone benefits from certainty: police
officers who must make snap decisions about the appropriateness of a
particular course of action in response to fast-moving events in the field;
individuals, who must decide whether or not to acquiesce to police
power or risk prosecution; prosecutors, who must predict the likelihood
of a successful prosecution; defence lawyers, who must advise their
clients whether they have a meritorious Charter claim; and trial judges,
who have the unenviable task of sorting through the mess and
adjudicating on the merits of Charter claims that are brought.91
88
Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society
(New York: MacMillan, 1994), at 12.
89
See generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 57, at 13-17.
90
See generally Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 57.
91
For a recent example of a trial judge openly acknowledging how difficult this task can be,
see R. v. Binning, [2006] B.C.J. No. 820 (S.C.). The trial judge noted that what has emerged is a:
… minefield through which the police must navigate, bearing in mind numerous trial and
appellate decisions which offer a variety of sometimes conflicting paths for the
investigating officers to follow as they carry out their enforcement activities. Given the
intricacy of the law, it is little wonder that in this case, as in other cases, particularly those
involving the drug trade, the energies expended by Crown, defence counsel, and the court
are directed not to what might innocently be thought of as the crucial issue, that being
whether the Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed
the alleged offence or offences, but with the painstakingly difficult task of ensuring that
there has been no breach of the accuseds’ Charter rights by the police during their
investigation.
Id., at para. 11.
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Finally, contrary to any suggestion that everything has been
decided, Orbanski & Elias aptly illustrates that when it comes to the
scope and limits on police power, far more remains to be decided than
has been settled. Of course, every unanswered question in this important
area has profound Charter implications. For example, knowing what the
limits are on police authority to detain motorists is inextricably
interwoven with the parameters of the constitutional right not to be
arbitrarily detained that is guaranteed by section 9 of the Charter. By
embracing case-by-case review as the means for assessing the breadth of
police power, the Court has left the constitutional right vulnerable to
indirect and gradual erosion as courts justify police actions from one
decision to the next. Under this system far from becoming “firmly
established” the governing principles seem to be growing increasingly
elusive.

IV. CONCLUSION
Our modest goal was to evaluate the claim that we have finally reached
a point in the Charter’s development with respect to questions regarding
criminal justice where the governing principles have become firmly
established and the time for experimentation has ended. Based simply
on how few Charter cases with a criminal justice component were
decided by the Supreme Court in 2005 one might be deceived into
believing that this is in fact the case. Closer scrutiny of those judgments,
however, reveals that there continues to be much uncertainty
surrounding a number of very basic Charter issues.
As our review of Pires & Lising and Henry in Part II illustrates,
even questions that may sometimes seem settled are open for
reconsideration under our common law constitutional system. In fact,
some level of uncertainty is not only inevitable but also necessary. In a
very real sense the long-term health of our Constitution and the integrity
of our Supreme Court both depend on the Court’s willingness to
reconsider its past constitutional decisions when the reasons for doing so
are compelling and the resolve to refrain from doing so when they are
not. In this sense, a view that “established principles” are better left
alone could actually threaten the long-term stability of our constitutional
system.
At the same time, our critical review of Orbanski & Elias in Part III
serves to illustrate that too much uncertainty can carry its own unique
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dangers. When it comes to the source, scope and limits on police
powers, clarity and comprehensiveness should be our goals.
Unfortunately, the sort of uncertainty that is fuelled by a judgment like
Orbanski & Elias brings its own pitfalls. Far from being well
established, the very notion of implied police powers embraced by the
Court in that case ensures that there will be much uncertainty into the
future surrounding a number of basic issues that have profound
constitutional implications.
In summary, the idea that everything has been decided and that there
is little room for constitutional experimentation when it comes to the
Charter and criminal justice is not borne out by the Supreme Court’s
judgments from 2005. There continues to be much uncertainty
surrounding a number of very basic but important constitutional issues
relating to the criminal justice system. Rather than having ended, the
time for experimentation seems to have just begun.

